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A Comprehensive Test of Order Choice Theory: 
Recent Evidence from the NYSE 
 
 A large theoretical literature on market microstructure develops the trader’s optimal order 
choice under a wide variety of trading mechanisms and market conditions. For example, Parlour 
(1998) finds that when an order depletes the depth available on a limit order book, the next trader 
is likely to choose an order replenishing depth (i.e., a market buy order is more likely followed 
by a limit sell). Thus, she predicts what can be thought of as negative autocorrelation in order 
type. Handa and Schwartz (1996) model the time that different investors allow themselves to 
trade and find that impatient traders endogenously choose market orders, whereas patient traders 
endogenously choose limit orders. By (informal) extension, we posit that extremely impatient 
traders might choose immediate automatic execution over slower floor execution and that their 
orders might be submitted virtually irrespective of how favorable or unfavorable the market 
conditions. Other variables predicted to effect order choice include quoted spread (Cohen, Maier, 
Schwartz, and Whitcomb 1981; Harris 1998; and Foucault 1999), volatility (Foucault 1999), 
prior own and market return (Brown and Jennings 1990), and time of day (Harris 1998; 
Hollifield, Miller, and Sandås 1999; Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar 2002). 
 We provide a comprehensive test of order choice theory. This tests some theories that 
have not been tested and tests many theories simultaneously. We use NYSE system order data to 
estimate a multinomial logit model of order choice. We study a wide spectrum of order choices 
including order type (market vs. limit), order side (buy vs. sell), order pricing aggressiveness 
(executable vs. limit prices better than, equal to, or worse than the current quote), order 
cancellation, execution method (automatic vs. floor), and the fundamental choice of doing 
nothing vs. order activity. Our multivariate analysis includes 17 independent variables designed 
to test theoretical order-choice models. We analyze a several sub-samples and conduct 
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robustness checks. Thus, we obtain a comprehensive and robust set of conclusions about how 
well actual NYSE order choices conform to what is predicted by theory. 
 We also provide the first analysis of order choice on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) from the era of decimal prices (i.e., penny tick size) and automatic executions via the 
NYSE’s Direct+ system. Recent studies document how profound both of these changes are. 
Chakravarty, Harris, and Wood (2001) find that switching to decimal prices yields more frequent 
and smaller quote adjustments, smaller quoted and effective spreads, and smaller depths. In 
addition, Bacidore, Battalio, and Jennings (2003) find that decimal prices result in a roughly 50% 
reduction in cumulative depth on the limit order book, smaller order sizes, and more frequent 
cancellations.  Jain (2002) analyzes 118 exchanges around the world and documents that the 
switch from a pure floor-based system to a combined floor and electronic system results in a 
lower cost of capital, higher volatility, and more volume. These market structure changes are 
very likely to impact order choice. Therefore, we believe it is interesting to analyze order choice 
on the NYSE from the decimal, Direct+ era. This complements prior work on order choice that 
analyzes the Paris Bourse (Biais, Hillion, and Spatt 1995), NASDAQ (Smith 2000), or 1990-
1991 NYSE using the TORQ dataset (Baewho, Jang, and Park 2002; Beber and Caglio 2002). 
 Order choice is important because it is the foundation of how the NYSE (or any security 
market) operates. Order submission and cancellation choices are central to the supply of and 
demand for liquidity. NYSE liquidity is provided by specialists and floor brokers, but public 
limit orders play a major role. For example, Kavajecz (1999) finds that public limit orders are 
represented in 64% of NYSE specialists’ quotes. Recent NYSE initiatives, such as Direct+ and 
OpenBook, have increased public limit orders’ importance. If we can better understand the 
market conditions under which traders demand liquidity and those under which (and at what 
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prices) they supply liquidity, then we can better understand the price formation process – 
markets’ most important role.  In addition, order choice affects execution quality, which is 
important to both consumers and regulators (for example, see SEC 2001b). 
One of our findings relates to Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995), who use descriptive 
statistics to demonstrate that the Paris Bourse exhibits positive first-order, serial correlation in 
order type (i.e., a limit sell order is most likely to be followed by another limit sell). This finding 
is counter to Parlour’s theoretical prediction and rather puzzling because it suggests that the limit 
order book grows more and more imbalanced.  We find that the NYSE also exhibits positive 
first-order, order-type serial correlation in 2001.  This is true in a multivariate setting where we 
control for other influences and is quite robust.  Biais, Hillon, and Spatt suggest that this result 
might be an artifact of order-splitting (i.e., a large limit sell is split into a sequence of smaller 
limit sells).  Our dataset identifies the firm and the specific branch within the firm submitting the 
order. This allows us to identify orders that appear to be split. We adjust the order flow process 
for order splitting, but still obtain positive first-order, serial correlation in order type.  However, 
when we look at longer time horizons (five minute intervals), we find negative serial correlation 
in changes in the order flow processes. The positive order-to-order serial correlation and 
negative five-minute serial correlation in changes can be reconciled. Both results are consistent 
with an order flow process that has inertia order-by-order, but slowly mean-reverts. Our finding 
of a slow mean-reverting order flow process resolves the puzzle of why the limit order book does 
not continue to become more imbalanced and supports Parlour’s theoretical predictions. 
Another key finding is that orders sent to Direct+ for automatic execution are much less 
sensitive to market conditions than orders sent to the floor. In other words, Direct+ orders are 
submitted with little respect for the previous order type, the current quoted spread or depth, 
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recent volume or volatility, past own or market return, or time of day. This is consistent with the 
claim that extremely impatient traders choose fast automatic execution no matter what; whereas 
only moderately impatient traders send their marketable orders to the floor with economically 
meaningful regard for market conditions. 
 We have several additional findings.  We document that, when the quoted depth is large, 
traders are more likely to “jump the queue” by submitting limit orders with limit prices bettering 
existing quotes and less likely to submit orders with limit prices equal to or worse than current 
quotes. In addition, a favorable (unfavorable) forecast of the rest-of-the-day stock return, as 
proxied by the realized rest-of-the-day stock return, increases the likelihood of a buy (sell) order. 
This provides evidence that some traders appear to be effectively exploit private information. If 
the recent market return is positive (negative), then more buy (sell) orders arrive.  This is 
consistent with momentum-oriented technical trading. We find that order activity is clustered. 
We find that doing nothing, defined as time passing with-out order activity, also is clustered.  
Consistent with previous work, we find that wider (narrower) spreads increase the probability 
of market (limit) orders.  However, we find that effect is limited primarily to small orders.  
Finally, we find that limit orders are more likely late in the trading day, which is inconsistent 
with the Harris (1998) and Hollifield, Miller, and Sandås (1999) prediction that traders switch 
from market orders to limit orders late in the trading day.  The fact that this result is driven 
mostly by aggressively-priced orders is consistent with Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar (2002) 
who provide experimental evidence that informed traders switch from demanding liquidity early 
in the day to provide liquidity late in the day. 
 To assess the economic significance of an explanatory variable’s impact on order choice, 
we calculate what we refer to as an impulse sensitivity. An impulse sensitivity is the change in 
 5
the estimated probability of the dependent variable caused by a one standard deviation shock in 
the explanatory variable. To determine the statistical significance of the direction of change in 
the estimated probability, we test the statistical significance of the impulse sensitivities, not the 
statistical significance of the multinomial logit coefficients. To the best of our knowledge, there 
is no technique in the prior literature to perform such a test, so we develop a test of the statistical 
significance of the impulse sensitivity. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents a literature review and states our 
hypotheses.  Section 2 describes the data we obtain from the NYSE.  In Section 3, we explain the 
empirical methodology.  Section 4 presents our results.  Section 5 concludes.  The appendix 
describes our new test of the statistical significance of an impulse sensitivity. 
1. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Last Event.  Parlour (1998) develops a model of a transparent limit order book with 
symmetric information. The probability of executing a limit order depends on the book’s state 
and the trader’s patience. Parlour notes that the arrival of a limit buy (sell) order lengthens the 
queue at the bid (ask) side of the book.  This reduces the attractiveness of submitting another 
limit order of the same kind. Hence, we should observe negative serial correlation in order type.  
Last Event Hypothesis: The probability of observing a limit buy (sell) is lowest if the 
immediately preceding event is a limit buy (sell).1 
Last Five Minutes.  In contrast with Parlour’s assumption of full transparency, the NYSE 
limit order book was closed to off-exchange traders during our sample period.  In other words, 
off-exchange traders might not see the last order before making their order choice. Although 
marketable orders usually fill and print quickly, specialists have 30 seconds to post limit orders 
with prices equaling or bettering current quotes and limit orders with limit prices worse than the 
                                                 
1 All hypotheses are stated as the alternative. 
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contemporaneous quotes are completely non-transparent to off-floor traders. To give the Parlour 
model a better chance to predict NYSE order strategy, we aggregate each type of order flow in 
five-minute intervals and test for serial correlation in changes in the order flow process.  The 
aggregation of order flow in the prior five-minute interval might better represent what a trader 
not on the floor of the NYSE can consider when submitting an order.2 
Last Five Minutes Hypothesis: The change in the number of limit buys (sells) over five- 
minute intervals is lower if the change in the number of limit buys (sells) over the preceding 
five-minute interval is higher. 
Auto-ex vs. Floor.  In 2000 the NYSE introduced Direct+; an electronic system that 
automatically executes small, marketable buy (sell) orders at the quoted ask (bid) price. The size 
of a Direct+ order is limited to the size of the quote it is trying to hit or 1099 shares, whichever is 
less. These orders fill within 2 or 3 seconds of arriving at the Exchange and are not eligible for 
price improvement. By contrast, marketable orders routed to the floor typically take 20 to 40 
seconds to execute and often receive price improvement from the floor’s oral auction process.  
Informally extending the Handa and Schwartz (1996) model, contrast an extremely 
impatient trader who believes he must trade in only a few seconds to a moderately impatient 
trader whose believes she must trade within the next one minute. The extremely impatient trader 
might endogenously choose automatic execution and his order might be submitted with little 
regard for market conditions. The moderately impatient trader might choose floor execution to 
get a better price on average and her order might have more regard for market conditions. 
Auto-ex Hypothesis: The sensitivity of automatically executed orders to market 
conditions is less than the sensitivity of floor orders to market conditions. 
                                                 
2  Obviously, there are limitations to how closely the NYSE resembles the theoretical market modeled by Parlour, 
which limits our ability to test her model precisely. 
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Spread.  Harris (1998) finds that wider spreads increase the cost of demanding liquidity 
and increase the reward to providing liquidity. This causes the marginal investor to switch from 
taking liquidity via market orders to supplying it with limits. Alternatively, Foucault (1999) finds 
that an increase in market volatility makes liquidity demanders less patient, which allows limit 
order submitters to widen their spread in order to extract greater rents. So, there is a positive 
relation between spreads and limit orders and a negative relation between spreads and market 
orders. Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995), Harris (1998), Hollifield, Miller and Sandås (1999), 
Smith (2000), Bae, Jang and Park (2002), and Ranaldo (2002) find evidence consistent with this 
claim. We extend the literature in two ways. First, we test the spread hypothesis differentiating 
between marketable limit orders and non-marketable limit orders. Second, we test the spread 
hypothesis differentiating between small, medium, and large orders. 
Spread Hypothesis: Narrow (wide) spreads increase the probability of marketable (non-
marketable) orders. 
Depth.  Berber and Caglio (2002) and Ranaldo (2000) analyze the quoted depth’s effect 
on order submission decisions. We extend the literature by investigating whether both sides of 
the quote seem to affect order choice or if only one side of the quote appears to matter to traders.  
We also test whether large ask (bid) depth appears to be viewed as forecasting a short-term price 
decrease (increase), leading to more sells (buys).  Finally we test whether a larger ask (bid) depth 
makes it more attractive to “jump-the-queue” by submitting a limit sell (buy) order with a limit 
price better than the quote and conversely less attractive to submit a limit sell (buy) order with a 
limit price equal to or worse than the quote. 
Short-term Forecasting Hypothesis:  Large ask (bid) depth increases the probability 
of both a limit sell (buy) and a market sell (buy). 
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Jump-The-Queue Hypothesis: Large ask (bid) depth increases the probability of an 
inside-the-quote limit sell (buy) and decreases the probability of an at-the-quote or behind-the-
quote limit sell (buy). 
Volatility.  Foucault (1999) suggests a model of a dynamic limit order market where 
across-agent variation in the consensus belief about asset valuation leads to a winner’s curse 
problem for traders. With greater volatility, limit orders are placed at less competitive prices as a 
compensation for the adverse selection risk.  Volatility also makes market orders less profitable. 
In equilibrium, the proportion of limit orders increases when return volatility is high.  Although 
Foucault examines the cross-section of securities, his prediction might be extended to the time-
series realm if traders can predict volatility (say, via a GARCH model).  Handa and Schwartz 
(1996) also predict that investors submit more limit orders when volatility rises.  Smith (2000), 
Ahn, Bae, and Chan (2001), Danielsson and Payne (2002), Hollifield, Miller, Sandås and Slive 
(2002), and Ranaldo (2002) find evidence consistent with a direct relation between security price 
volatility and limit order arrival frequency.  Hasbrouck and Saar (2002), however, find the 
opposite.  In addition, increased volatility in the stock price might be a result of the arrival of 
valuation-relevant information.  If this is the case, then we anticipate that no trading activity is 
less likely immediately following volatile periods. 
Volatility Hypothesis:  Higher return volatility is associated with more frequent limit 
orders and less frequent periods of no trading activity. 
 Market Return and Own Return.  Technical traders use public information reflected in 
security prices (such as own returns, market returns, etc.) to forecast future price movements. An 
extensive academic literature analyzes technical trading rules based on past security/market 
returns (see Brown and Jennings 1990; Gencay 1998; Sullivan 1999; Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang 
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2000; Ready 2002). It is not unusual for day traders to use minute-by-minute “momentum” or 
“contrarian” trading strategies.3  The presence of such traders suggests that there may be short-
term patterns to exploit. We allow for this possibility with the following hypothesis. 
 Market Return Hypothesis: A non-zero market return is associated with changes in 
order choice. 
 Own Return Hypothesis: A non-zero own return is associated with changes in order 
choice.   
Time-of- day.  In addition to the well-documented U-shaped intra-day pattern in trading 
activity (e.g. Chung, Van Ness and Van Ness 1999), the economics literature notes a “deadline 
effect,” where agreements are more likely to be reached at the last minute. For example, Roth et 
al (1988) conduct experiments testing for bargaining patterns through time and find that many 
agreements occur just before the deadline. This suggests that traders become more aggressive as 
the close of trading approaches.   In contrast, Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar (2002) use an 
experimental asset market to model traders’ behavior in an electronic limit order book.  They 
find that liquidity provision evolves during the trading day.  Informed traders demand liquidity 
early in the trading session by submitting orders that hit existing limit orders but become 
suppliers of liquidity by submitting more limit orders towards the end of the trading day. 
Time of Day Hypothesis: As the close of the trading day approaches, the distribution of 
order types changes. 
We simultaneously test these hypotheses using a multinomial logit model and electronic order 
data from the New York Stock Exchange. 
 
                                                 
3 See many examples in “Risky Business: The Day Traders” in the Investigate Reports video series available on the 
A&E web site (www.aetv.com). 
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2. Data  
 We obtain system order data from the NYSE.  Because of the volume of data, we select a 
sample of NYSE-listed equity securities.  Initially, we choose the 50 most actively traded NYSE 
stocks during the 20 trading days prior to January 29, 2001.  We also randomly select 25 stocks 
from each of four Volume-Price groups.  To pick the 100-stock random sample, we rank NYSE-
listed securities on share trading volume and, separately, on average NYSE trade price during the 
20 trading days prior to January 29, 2001.  Each security is placed into one of four categories 
after comparing its share price to median NYSE share price and its trading volume to median 
NYSE volume.  These groups (of unequal numbers of stocks) are a high-volume:high-price 
group, a high-volume:low-price group, a low-volume:high-price group, and, a low-volume:low-
price group.  Within each group, we arrange securities alphabetically (by symbol) and choose 
every Nth security, where N is chosen to select 25 securities from that group.  Because two of the 
50 stocks with the highest trading volume also are randomly chosen as part of the high volume 
groups, our final sample has 148 securities. 
 We use the NYSE’s System Order Database (SOD) and its companion quote file (SODQ) 
to provide an audit trail of system (SuperDOT) orders arriving during the week of April, 30 to 
May 4, 2001.4  SOD contains order and execution information for NYSE system orders.  Order 
data include security, order type, a buy-sell indicator, order size, order date and time, limit price 
(if applicable), and the identity of the member firm submitting the order.  Execution data include 
the trade’s date and time, the execution price, the number of shares executing, and (if relevant) 
cancellation information.  SODQ contains the NYSE quote and the best non-NYSE quote at the 
time an order arrives and at trade time.  All records (orders, executions, and cancellations) are 
                                                 
4 We have data for April, May, and June for the 148 sample stocks.  The large number of order submissions and 
cancellations makes sampling necessary.  We choose this week for our sample period because it appears “typical” of 
the entire time period in terms of market return and order mix.     
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time-stamped to the second.  System orders represent about 93% of reported NYSE orders and 
47% of reported NYSE share volume.5 Specifically, these data do not include most of the orders 
routed to the specialists’ trading posts via floor brokers.  Thus, we study only a subset of NYSE 
order choices; those resulting in electronic submission of orders.  Generally, these are the 
smaller, more easily executed orders.  Our sample includes over 5.1 million events.  We exclude 
orders arriving when the National Best Bid (NBB) price exceeds the National Best Offer (NBO) 
price or when the NBB or NBO size is zero.6 
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for these and other variables.  
[Insert Table 1.] 
The mean order size is 1,232 shares.  Although this is relatively small, we have large orders, as 
suggested by the maximum order size of 900,000 shares.  On average, our sample stocks have 
2.24 million shares trading per day, which is a .106% turnover rate.  This undoubtedly exceeds 
the typical NYSE stock because our sample includes the 50 most actively traded NYSE stocks.  
The average NYSE bid (offer) depth is 2,760 (3,701) shares.  For the sample stocks (again, 
oriented to the more actively traded NYSE stocks), the spread averages 0.15% of the stock’s 
$43.80 average “price,” i.e., bid-ask spread midpoint.  We do, however, have some observations 
where the spread is a large fraction of the stock’s price. The average time of an event is 153.76 
five-minute intervals past midnight, or approximately 12:48pm. The average five-minute own- 
and market-return are positive during the sample period.  The own-return has more cross-
sectional volatility than the market return. The private information variable (measured as the 
change in the quote midpoint between order arrival time and that day’s closing) averages 0.27%. 
 
                                                 
5 See SEC (2001a), page 5. 
6 The National Best Bid (Offer) price is the higher (lower) of the NYSE bid (ask) and the best non-NYSE bid (ask).   
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Variables 
 We analyze the likelihood of observing particular events – the submission of different 
order types and order cancellations. In addition, because the trader can choose to do nothing, we 
design a role for clock time passing with no activity. Specifically, we define a no-activity event 
as a stock-specific time interval passing without an order submission or cancellation. The no-
activity time interval is defined as either: (1) the median time between successive order events, 
or (2) five minutes, whichever is less. There is considerable variation across stocks in their no-
activity time intervals. The eight most active stocks have a no-activity time interval of one 
second. The 50 least active stocks have a median time between events exceeding five minutes 
and, thus, receive a no-activity time interval of five minutes.  Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1997) 
use a similar no-activity event to model and estimate the passage of clock time without activity. 
Beginning with the first trade of each day, we compute the time between successive pairs 
of order submissions/cancellations. If the elapsed time exceeds the no-activity interval, then we 
insert the appropriate number of no-activity events. For example, suppose that a stock has a 
median time between order activity events of 20 seconds and that orders arrive at 9:30:00, 
9:30:05, and 9:30:50.  There are fewer than 20 seconds between the first and second order, so a 
no-activity event is NOT inserted.  Between the second and third order, we insert no-activity 
events at 9:30:25 and 9:30:45. The 4:00:00 closing is taken as the end of the trading day. 
We distinguish four order types: Market Buy, Market Sell, Limit Buy and Limit Sell. We 
see in Table 1 that these order types account for 57% of the events (= .1250 + .1266 + .1641 + 
.1546).  Thus, a cancellation or no-activity event occurs 43% of the time. The fact that limit 
orders are more frequent than market orders is consistent with extant literature finding that limit 
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orders are more frequent than market orders on the NYSE (e.g., Harris and Hasbrouck, 1996).  A 
simple count of the dependent variables provides a similar mix of events: no-activity events are 
32.5% of the observations, cancellations are 14.8%, limit buy orders are 18.0%, limit sell orders 
are 17.1%, and market buys and sells orders are 8.8% each. 
 Our analysis differentiates among four types of limit orders: behind-the-quote, at-the-
quote, inside-the-quote, and marketable.  We place each limit order into one of the categories by 
comparing the limit price to NYSE quoted prices.  Behind-the-quote buy (sell) orders have limit 
prices less (more) than the NYSE bid (ask) price.  At-the-quote buy (sell) orders have limit 
prices equal to the NYSE bid (ask) price.  Inside-the-quote orders have limit prices between the 
NYSE bid price and the NYSE ask price.  Finally, buy (sell) marketable limit orders have limit 
prices greater (less) than or equal to the NYSE ask (bid) price.7  Behind-the quote limit orders 
are the least aggressive and market orders are the most aggressive.  We distinguish between the 
cancellations of buy and sell orders. To identify the model, one event must be designated as the 
base case. We arbitrarily designate the no-activity event as our base case.   
 Based on extant theoretical and empirical work on order submission strategy, we identify 
17 explanatory variables.8   We define these variables below. 
1. Last event market buy takes the value of 1 if the previous event was a buy market order and 0 
otherwise; 
 
2. Last event market sell takes the value of 1 if the previous event was a sell market order and 0 
otherwise; 
 
2. Last event limit buy takes the value of 1 if the previous event was a limit buy order and zero 
otherwise; 
 
4. Last event limit sell takes the value of 1 if the previous event was a limit sell order and zero 
otherwise; 
                                                 
7 Peterson and Sirri (2002) provide a more detailed discussion of marketable limit orders. 
8 Using the Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) method, we do not find a muti-collinearity problem among our 
explanatory variables. 
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5. Last event cancel buy takes the value of 1 if previous event was cancellation of a buy order 
and 0 otherwise; 
 
6. Last event cancel sell takes the value of 1 if the previous event was cancellation of a sell order 
and 0 otherwise; 
 
7. Percentage spread is measured as the NYSE bid-ask spread divided by the average of the bid 
and ask prices at the time the order is submitted; 9  
 
8. Relative NYSE Bid size is the size (in hundreds of shares) associated with the NYSE’s bid 
price at the time of the event divided by the number of shares outstanding (in millions); 
 
9. Relative NYSE Ask size is the size (in hundreds of shares) associated with the NYSE’s ask 
price at the time of the event divided by the number of shares outstanding (in millions); 
 
10. Relative volume is the natural logarithm of the number of shares traded in the five-minute 
interval prior to the event divided by the number of shares outstanding; 
 
11. Own return is the percent change in the stock’s midpoint (i.e., the average of the best bid and 
best ask prices) in the five-minute interval before the event; 
 
12. Own return squared is the stock’s own return squared; 
 
13. Market return is the percentage change in the quoted spread’s midpoint for the exchange 
traded fund mimicking the S&P500 (SPY) in the five-minute interval prior to the event; 
 
14. Time is the time of day of the event expressed as the number of five-minute intervals since 
midnight (e.g., 9:30:00am to 9:34:59am is interval 114); 
 
15. Time from noon squared is the deviation of the event’s time interval from the mid-day time 
interval (153) squared; 
 
16. Private information is a measure of the traders’ current private information as proxied by the 
future change in stock value. It is calculated as [(closing NYSE quoted spread midpoint) - (order-
time NYSE quoted spread midpoint)]/(order-time NYSE quoted spread  midpoint); and, 
 
17. NYSE not at the NBBO is a binary variable equal to one in the case that the NYSE bid is not 
equal to the National Best Bid or in the case that NYSE offer is not equal to the National Best 
Offer and it’s equal to zero otherwise.  
 
 
 
                                                 
9 We obtain similar results if we use both dollar spread and price (or inverse price) in the regressions. 
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3.2. Models 
 We specify the following multinomial logit model for each stock i and time t over which 
an event can occur. 
Event typei,t = a + b1(Last event cancel buy)i,t + b2(Last event cancel sell)i,t + b3(Last event limit 
buy)i,t + b4(Last event limit sell)i,t + b5(Last event market buy)i,t + b6(Last event market sell)i,t + 
b7(Percentage spread)i,t + b8(Relative NYSE bid size)i,t + b9(Relative NYSE ask size)i,t + 
b10(Relative volume)i,t-1 + b11(Own return)i,t-1 + b12(Own return squared)i,t-1 + b13(Market 
return)t-1 + b14(Time)t + b15(Time from noon squared)t +b16(Private information)i,t + b17(NYSE 
not at NBBO)i,t + ei,t                   (1) 
 
In this specification, the subscript “t” represents a contemporaneous value.  The subscript “t-1” 
represents an aggregate value from the preceding five-minute interval.  To compute the values 
for these five-minute intervals, we begin with the 9:30:00-to-9:34:59 interval.  We proceed to 
compute values for each five-minute interval throughout the day, ending with the time from 
3:55:00 to 4:00:00.  Thus, for example, the “t-1” interval associated with an order arriving at 
9:42:30 is the 9:35:00-9:39:59 interval. We run two types of multinomial logit models with 
different event structures.10 
 Initially, we analyze a 7-way event structure. The seven events are: (1) cancellation of an 
existing buy order, (2) cancellation of an existing sell order, (3) the arrival of a Limit Buy order, 
(4) the arrival of a Limit Sell order, (5) the arrival of a Market Buy order, (6) the arrival of a 
Market Sell order, or (7) No Activity in a stock-specific time interval since the last event.11 Next, 
                                                 
10 Our approach can be thought of as randomly selecting a single representative trader and assessing his/her actions.  
We do not model the number of traders present in the market at a particular time.   
11 For the 7-way event structure, the “market buy” (“market sell”) event includes marketable limit buys (sells), 
because both types of orders are liquidity-demanding, executable orders. The “limit buy” (“limit sell”) event 
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we conduct a more detailed analysis using a 13-way event  structure: (1) Cancellation of a buy 
order, (2) Cancellation of a sell order, (3) Behind-The-Quote Limit Buy, (4) At-The-Quote Limit 
Buy, (5) Inside-The-Quote Limit Buy, (6) Marketable Limit Buy, (7) Behind-The-Quote Limit 
Sell, (8) At-The-Quote Limit Sell, (9) Inside-The-Quote Limit Sell, (10) Marketable Limit Sell, 
(11) Market Buy, (12) Market Sell, or (13) No Activity (order arrival or cancellation) in a stock-
specific time interval since the last event. 
4. Results  
4.1. Stock-By-Stock Estimation 
We estimate equation (1) separately for each stock using all the stock’s events.12  Table 2 
reports the results of the 7-way event structure estimation, which ignores limit orders’ pricing 
aggressiveness. Table 3 provides the results of the 13-way event structure, which considers order 
pricing aggressiveness. Both tables report the mean estimates from the stock-by-stock analysis. 
In each table, Panel A reports the mean coefficient estimates from the multinomial logit 
regression and Panel B presents the mean impulse sensitivities. Again, an impulse sensitivity is 
the change in the probability of a dependent variable (row) caused by a one standard deviation 
increase in an explanatory variable (column). 
 To compute the impulse sensitivities reported in Panel B, we define the benchmark 
probability of each event as the estimated logistic function evaluated at the mean of each of the 
explanatory variables.  In the 7-way analysis, we estimate that the probability of no activity is 
                                                                                                                                                             
includes only non-marketable limit orders, because these orders are the liquidity supplying. For expositional clarity, 
the “market order” vs. “limit order” terminology is used. 
12 For 85 of the sample stocks, we observe all order events during the sample period and find that the maximum 
likelihood regression converges.  We aggregate the data from the remaining stocks in one regression.  Thus, for our 
stock-by-stock analysis, we have 86 observations.  Estimating equation (1) with the entire panel of data (i.e., for all 
stocks simultaneously) gives similar conclusions.  We note that the stock-by-stock analysis, with its 86 observations, 
is a conservative approach to the statistical test compared to the literally millions of observations in the panel 
regression.  Assuming only 86 observations also is conservative to reporting average test statistics from the 
regressions, which have thousands of observations. 
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44%, the probability of a limit buy (sell) order of 18% (17%), the probability of a market buy or 
market sell order is 9%, and the probability of a cancelled order is 3.65%.  The 13-way analysis 
provides similar estimates of the likelihood of cancellations and marketable orders, but estimates 
that limit orders are less likely (14% for buys and 16% for sells) and no-activity intervals are 
more likely (49.7%) than the 7-way event model.  To compute the change in the probabilities 
(impulse sensitivities), we successively re-evaluate the estimated logistic function after adding a 
standard deviation to the mean of one explanatory variable without disturbing the means of the 
other explanatory variables.  Thus, the column labeled “Percent Spread” in Panel B of Tables 2 
and 3 reports the impulse sensitivity based on a one standard deviation increase in the percent 
spread holding all other explanatory variables constant at their mean levels. 
Our hypotheses are statements about the impulse sensitivities, so we discuss, interpret, 
and test the impulse sensitivities, not the coefficient estimates. In most cases, the sign of the 
multinomial coefficient estimate is the same as that of the impulse sensitivity, but not always.13  
For example, in Table 2 Panel A, the Market Buy coefficient in the Last Limit Sell column is 
+0.575, but Panel B’s Market Buy impulse sensitivity in the Last Limit Sell column is -0.12%.  
What matters for the multinomial logit coefficients is their relative size. In this case, the Market 
Buy coefficient is smaller than the other coefficients in the Last Limit Sell column, so the Market 
Buy impulse sensitivity is negative and the other non-base case impulse sensitivities are positive.   
Because our hypotheses are concerned with the sign of the impulse sensitivities, we wish 
to test if an impulse sensitivity is statistically significantly different from zero. There appears to 
be no established procedure to do this. The appendix derives a new econometric procedure for 
                                                 
13 They may differ because the multinomial logit coefficients affect the denominator of a probability calculation, as 
well as the numerator. 
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testing the statistical significance of an impulse sensitivity.  We summarize our hypotheses 
regarding the expected signs of the impulse sensitivities in Panel C of Table 2. 
[Insert Tables 2 and 3.] 
 Last event. Based on the theoretical work of Parlour (1998) and the empirical work of 
Bias, Hillion, and Spatt (1995), we are interested in the first-order serial correlations of order 
types. Consider marketable orders. Examining Table 2, we find that marketable buy (sell) orders 
are most likely to follow marketable buy (sell) orders. That is, the largest impulse sensitivity in 
the “Last Market Buy” (“Last Market Sell”) column is associated with marketable buy (sell) 
orders. This is evidence from the marketable order categories of positive serial correlation in 
order type (a positive diagonal effect). This finding is consistent with the findings in Biais, 
Hillion, and Spatt (1995) and Yeo (2002) and is inconsistent with the Last Event Hypothesis. A 
marketable order takes liquidity from the limit order book and produces a shorter queue for new 
limit orders to stand behind.  Parlor (1998) suggests that liquidity suppliers are more willing to 
join shorter queues.  Thus, we expect that marketable orders would be followed by limit orders 
replenishing the extinguished liquidity (limit sells following market buys and limit buys after 
market sells).  In fact, we find that the likelihood of limit orders arriving on the opposite side of 
the book from where liquidity was taken increases more after the arrival of a marketable order 
than the likelihood of a limit order replacing the taken liquidity. 
 When the previous event is a limit order, the results are equally clear.  For limit buy (sell) 
orders, the likelihood of a limit buy (sell) increases the most.  The positive serial correlation from 
the limit order categories also is inconsistent with the Last Event Hypothesis.14  Parlour’s 
                                                 
14 As a robustness check on the positive serial correlation in order type findings, we check two alternative 
specifications. First, we estimate the same 7-way event structure but drop the spread, bid depth, and ask depth 
explanatory variables. Second, we estimate the same 7-way event structure but drop the spread, bid depth, ask depth, 
volume, and volatility explanatory variables. Our thought was that perhaps these highly transparent (to off-floor 
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predictions do not seem to hold on an order-by-order basis.  Table 3 confirms that the arrival of a 
limit buy (sell) order increases the likelihood of seeing another non-marketable limit buy (sell) 
order for all levels of pricing aggressiveness except (including) marketable orders. 
 Finally, we examine the changes in probabilities conditional on an order’s cancellation.  
Our results are consistent with a trader canceling existing limit orders and submitting new ones.  
When a buy (sell) order is cancelled, the most likely subsequent event is the arrival of a new buy 
(sell) limit order.  Table 3 indicates that the increase in likelihood of non-marketable limit orders 
is common across all levels of pricing aggressiveness. 
 Activity and No Activity. We see that most of the impulse sensitivities associated with the 
last event variables are positive.  This suggests that order activity is clustered – the arrival or 
cancellation of any type of order significantly increases the likelihood of additional order activity 
and decreases the likelihood of no activity.   
No activity is also clustered. To see this, note that the arrival or cancellation of an order 
significantly decreases the likelihood of a no-activity interval. By implication, if we observe no 
activity, the likelihood of a subsequent no-activity interval increases. Thus, we extend the Bias, 
Hillion, and Spatt (1995) diagonal effect to no activity intervals as well. 
 Percentage spreads. In Table 2, we find that wide spreads increase the probability of 
non-marketable orders and decrease the probability of marketable orders. This is consistent with 
the Spread Hypothesis and with prior findings by Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995), Harris (1998), 
Hollifield, Miller and Sandås (1999), Smith (2000), Bae, Jang and Park (2002), and Ranaldo 
(2002).  In Table 3, we extend the literature by finding that wide spreads lower the probability of 
marketable limit orders, just like market orders. Whereas, wide spreads increase the probability 
                                                                                                                                                             
traders) explanatory variables absorb some impact of the less transparent Last Event variables. In unreported results, 
the positive serial correlation in order type (positive diagonal effect) is every bit as strong in these two alternative 
specifications. 
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of on inside-the-quote and at-the-quote orders limit orders and marginally reduced the 
probability of behind-the-quote limit orders. In other words, marketable limit orders respond to 
the spread more like market orders than non-marketable limit orders. In a later section, we test 
the spread hypothesis for small, medium, and large orders. 
 Depth.  Table 2 shows that the quoted depth influences orders on both sides of the 
market. A large ask (bid) depth increases the probability of a limit sell (buy) and decreases the 
probability of a limit buy (sell). Table 2 also shows that a large ask (bid) depth increases the 
probability of both a limit sell (buy) and a market sell (buy).  This supports the Short-Term 
Forecasting Hypothesis. 
Table 3 shows that large ask (bid) depth increases the probability of an inside-the-quote 
limit sell (buy) and decreases the probability of both at-the-quote or behind-the-quote limit sells 
(buys). This fully supports the Jump-The-Queue Hypothesis.  
 Trading Volume. Generally, elevated trading volume in the prior five-minute interval is 
associated with more contemporaneous trading activity (less frequent no-activity events).  That 
is, order activity has positive serial correlation.  This is consistent with the Volume Hypothesis.  
The relative magnitudes of the probability changes suggest that much of this activity is new, not 
replacement, orders.  That is, the increased likelihood of a new limit order is greater than the 
increased likelihood of an order cancellation. 
 Own return. We find support for the Own Return Hypothesis in Table 2.  Own return in 
the previous five-minute interval is positively correlated with the frequency of buy orders and 
negatively correlated with the likelihood of sell orders.  Thus, there appears to be short-term 
“momentum” trading; buying (selling) as the price increases (decreases).  For limit orders, some 
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of this might be mechanical refilling of the bid (ask) side of the limit order book after a price 
increase (decrease).   
 Volatility.  Squaring own-return provides an estimate of the time-series price volatility. 
We find that lagged volatility is associated with an increased probability of all order activities.  
The increase in non-marketable limit order probability in Table 2 is large relative to the increase 
in marketable order likelihood, which is weakly consistent with the Volatility Hypothesis.15  
Table 3 suggests that the increased likelihood of non-marketable limit orders is focused on at- 
and behind-the-quote orders.  Thus, traders tend not to narrow spreads after volatile periods. 
 Market return. After controlling for the security’s own return, the return on the market 
(S&P 500 Exchange Traded Fund) in the prior five-minute interval increases the likelihood of 
buy orders and decreases the likelihood of sell orders, providing support to the Market Return 
Hypothesis. This is consistent with the idea that a trader views the market return as a leading 
indicator for a security’s short-term price change. The effect on non-marketable limit orders 
detailed in Table 3 suggests that traders become more aggressive on the bid side (increasing the 
likelihood of at- and inside-the-quote orders) and less aggressive on the offer side when the 
return on the market in the previous five minute interval is positive. 
Time-from-noon Squared. The time-from-noon-squared variable is large when events 
occur early or late in the day. This controls for the documented (e.g., Chung, Van Ness and Van 
Ness, 1999) U-shaped intra-day trading pattern.  In Table 2, all events’ impulse sensitivities 
associated with an increase in Time Squared are positive. This suggests that all order types and 
cancellations are more frequent early and late in the trading day. This is consistent with a U-
shaped trading pattern.  Not surprisingly, the no-activity event is less likely early or late in the 
                                                 
15 Because the likelihood of order cancellation also increases in volatility, many of the limit orders might be 
replacement orders.  It is not obvious that Foucault (1999) makes time series predictions regarding volatility.  
Hasbrouck and Saar (2002) do not support the predictions of Foucault in the cross-section. 
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trading day.  Table 3 shows that the U-shaped intra-day pattern is less pronounced for at- and 
inside-the-quote limit orders.   
 Time-of-day. After controlling for the U-shaped intra-day pattern in trading activity, the 
time-of-day is not significantly positively associated with the likelihood of cancellations or with 
the probability of marketable order arrivals.  This is inconsistent with the hypothesis that a trader 
converts from limit orders to market orders during the trading day as they become less patient 
toward the close of trading (e.g., Harris, 1998).  However, we find that the likelihoods of at- and 
inside-the-quote limit orders rise as the end of trading approaches.  This is consistent with the 
experiment in Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar (2002), that finds that informed traders demand 
liquidity early in the day but later assume the role of market maker.   
Private information. Although own return and market return in the previous five-minute 
interval might control for public information arriving in the market, we also might wish to 
control for current private information that has not yet been reflected in the security’s price.  Our 
forward-looking, private information proxy is the change in the spread’s midpoint between an 
orders’ arrival and day’s end.  The impulse sensitivities associated with buy orders are positive 
and the impulse sensitivities associated with sell orders are negative.  This suggests that as the 
value of the private information variable increases (meaning that there is favorable private 
information) the fraction of buy orders in total order flow increases.  Conversely, when the 
private information variable suggests unfavorable private information, then the portion of sell 
orders in the total order flow increases.  Private information appears to particularly affect the 
likelihood of at- and inside-the-quote non-marketable limit orders and marketable orders.16 
                                                 
16 As a robustness check, we drop the “look-ahead” private information variable and re-estimate the 7-way event 
structure and the 13-way event structure. The non-reported results do not change our conclusions with respect to 
other variables. 
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 NYSE not at the NBBO. It is possible that traders behave differently when the NYSE 
quote is not at the NBBO than when it is.  For example, when the NYSE is not at the NBBO, 
then a limit order which merely matches the NBBO will get you first in line on the NYSE. Thus, 
we expect more inside-the-quote limit orders when the NYSE is not at the NBBO. Looking at 
Table 3, Panel B, we observe an increased probability of inside-the-quote limit orders when the 
NYSE is not at the NBBO. We also see an increase in cancellation activity. This supports that 
idea that traders rationally increase their provision of liquidity when there is a competitive 
opportunity to do so. 
4.2. The Order Flow Process Over Longer Horizons 
Parlour (1998) assumes full transparency of the limit order book, but off-exchange 
traders do not have access to the NYSE limit order book during our sample period.  To give the 
Parlour model a fairer test, we analyze order choices aggregated over longer time intervals.  As a 
starting point, consider a simple plot of aggregate buys and aggregate sells over five-minute 
intervals. Figure 1 shows the total number of buy orders (solid diamonds) and sell orders (empty 
squares) submitted in five minute intervals for 148 stocks by time of day on April 3, 2001. A 
quadratic function (solid curve) has been fitted to the data by choosing the quadratic parameters 
to minimize the sum of squared errors. 
[Insert Figure 1.] 
We find a U-shaped pattern in order arrival over the trading day similar to what others 
have found for volume and volatility. In addition, there seem to be alternating buy “waves” and 
sell “waves”. Indeed, the deviations of the buy orders from the quadratic function and the 
deviations of the sell orders from the quadratic function have a negative correlation of -33.6%. 
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Turning to a multivariate analysis, we estimate a new version of equation (1) aggregated 
over five-minute intervals. To do this we define an order flow process for each order type 
(market buy, market sell, limit buy, limit sell, cancel buy, cancel sell) or no activity event by 
counting the number of orders/events during five-minute intervals throughout the trading day. 
The new dependent variables are the change in the number of orders/events for a given stock 
over a five-minute interval compared to the previous five-minute interval. Similarly, the new 
version of the “Last Event” variables are “Last Five Minute” explanatory variables, defined as 
the change in the number of orders/events for a given stock over the last five-minute period 
compared to the lag-two five-minute period. In the same spirit, the new version of spread, bid 
size, and ask size are the average spread, average bid size, and average ask size over the five-
minute interval. NYSE at the BBO becomes the fraction of the five-minute interval that the 
NYSE quoted prices match both the best bid and the best offer. 
 We estimate the new version of equation (1) with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). In 
Panel A, we report estimated OLS regression coefficients, where each row is one regression. In 
Panel B, we report economic sensitivities. An economic sensitivity is the change in the number 
of orders/events caused by a one standard deviation shock in the explanatory variable. The bold 
numbers are significant at the 1% level based on a standard t-test. Since we are aggregating by 
five-minute intervals, the sample size is reduced to 11,398. 
[Insert Table 4.] 
 We find that the five-minute order flow process has very different properties than the 
order-by-order process. None of the coefficients for percent spread, relative bid size, relative ask 
size, relative volume, or time squared are statistically significant or economically significant. 
Most of the Last Five Minute coefficients are both statistically significant and economically 
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significant. Looking down the Panel A diagonal of the Last Five Minute coefficients, we see that 
all of the estimated correlation coefficients are negative (e.g. Last Cancel Buy has a -0.41 
coefficient with Cancel Buy) and statistically significant. All of the off-diagonal coefficients are 
positive or less negative than the diagonal coefficients. Turning to Panel B, we see that the 
economic sensitivities of the Last Five Minute variables tend to be much larger in absolute value 
than the economic sensitivities of the other explanatory variables. All of the diagonal terms have 
large negative economic sensitivities. All of the off-diagonal economic sensitivities are positive 
or less negative than the diagonal economic sensitivities. Overall, this is a strong evidence of a 
negative serial correlation in changes in the order flow process (that is, a negative diagonal 
effect). It is both statistically and economically significant. This supports the Last Five Minutes 
Hypothesis and strongly supports the Parlour model. 
 How can the order-by-order results and the five-minute results be reconciled? First, it is 
not unusual to have very different patterns at different levels of time aggregation. For example, 
stock returns exhibit negative serial correlation on a minute-by-minute basis due to bid-ask 
bounce (see Jegadeesh 1990 and Lehmann 1990), positive serial correlation over 3- to 12-month 
holding periods (see Jegadeesh and Titman 1993 and Rouwenhorst 1998), and negative serial 
correlation over 3- to 5-year holding periods (see DeBondt and Thaler 1985). Second, the order-
by-order results and five-minute results both are consistent with order flow processes that are 
slowly mean-reverting. The five-minute negative serial correlation in changes causes the level of 
the process to mean-revert, which drives the process back towards long-run balance. In other 
words, we find that the economic forces analyzed by Parlour control the longer-term, five-minute 
dynamics, which tend to maintain the longer-term equilibrium. 
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4.3. Separating Auto-ex Orders from Floor Orders 
 
 In Table 5, we separately consider orders routed to the automatic execution system 
(Direct+) and orders routed to the floor. Specifically, the marketable order types are subdivided 
into auto-ex or floor.  Thus, we estimate a 9-way event model: (1) cancel buy; (2) cancel sell; (3) 
limit buy order; (4) limit sell order; (5) floor marketable buy; (6) floor marketable sell; (7) auto-
ex marketable buy; (8) auto-ex marketable sell; and, (9) no activity.  We pool data across stocks 
for this regression.  Due to the large number of observations with this approach, all of the 
impulse sensitivities are statistically significant. 
[Insert Table 5.] 
 Panel A shows the impulse sensitivities for the 9-way event model. The most striking 
result is that the impulse sensitivities of the auto-ex orders are much smaller than those of the 
floor orders. To see how much smaller they are, Panel B shows the value of the floor impulse 
sensitivity relative to the auto-ex impulse sensitivity. The median ratio for marketable buys is 69 
and the median ratio for marketable sells is 140. Auto-ex orders are very insensitive to market 
conditions; whereas floor orders have economically meaningful regard for market conditions. 
This supports the proposition that extremely impatient traders submit auto-ex orders, whereas 
moderately impatient traders submit marketable floor orders. 
4.4 Robustness 
 As one robustness check, we re-estimate the 7-way event structure and the 13-way event 
structure using data from the first day of our sample (April 3) and again using the last day of our 
sample (June 27). These results, which we do not report, are strongly similar to the results in 
Tables 2 and 3.17  In all of the reported robustness checks below, we re-estimate equation (1) 
                                                 
17  We also perform a non-reported robustness check for potential endogeneity problems.  It is possible that 
contemporaneous volume, quotes and volatility might be co-determined.  To address this we use an instrument for 
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using pooled data.  That is, we do not estimate equation (1) separately for each stock.  Our 
pooled regression has sufficient observations so that all regression coefficients and impulse 
sensitivities are different from zero at traditional significance levels.  Therefore, we do not report 
significance levels. We only discuss when the conclusions differ from the results presented in the 
previous section.  In order to save space, we report only the impulse sensitivities. 
4.4.1 Order Size 
 Table 6 provides the impulse sensitivities resulting from re-estimating equation (1) 
conditional on the size of the order.  We arbitrarily construct three order-size categories.  Small 
orders are defined as orders of fewer than 1,000 shares.  Medium orders range between 1,000 
and 9,999 shares.  Large orders exceed 9,999 shares.  We pool (across stocks) all orders in the 
given size categories for each re-estimation.  
 [Insert Table 6.] 
An interesting finding comes from testing the spread hypothesis by order size. We find 
that a wide spread greatly increases (decreases) small limit (market) orders, moderately increases 
(decrease) medium limit (market) orders, but has little effect on large limit (market) orders. This 
is probably because a large order size dwarfs the quoted depth and so the quoted spread is a far 
less relevant predictor of trading cost for these orders.  In general, we note that most of the 
impulse sensitivities are smaller for large orders. This is especially true for large limit orders.  
4.4.2 Volume and Price Level 
 Recall that 100 of our sample securities are selected to provide cross-sectional dispersion 
across trading volume and security price.  As a robustness check, we re-estimate the logit model 
conditioning on volume and price.  Table 7 shows these results.  Panel A pools the data from the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the volume in the previous five-minute interval.  The instrument we use is the volume in the five-minute interval 
prior to the previous five-minute interval (i.e., t-2).  This alternative specification does not alter our conclusions in 
any meaningful manner. 
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50 most active stocks.  Panel B’s (C’s) impulse sensitivities result from examining the high-
volume:high-priced (:low-priced) stocks.  Finally Panel D pools the low-volume stocks’ data. 
Pooling all 50 low volume stocks is necessary to obtain convergence of the maximum likelihood 
estimation of equation (1). 
[Insert Table 7.] 
Although the results generally are strongest for the higher volume subsets, most conclusions are 
consistent across the various volume-price groups.  A few exceptions are evident.  For the low-
volume stocks, we find that the likelihood of marketable orders falls as the volume and volatility 
in the prior five-minute interval increases.  This might suggest that market orders in low-volume 
stocks are subject to sloppy executions in difficult markets.  The Volatility Hypothesis (of 
Foucault, 1999) is supported for the low-volume stocks. In addition, the likelihood of limit buy 
(sell) orders increases (decreases) as the market return from the previous five-minute interval 
increases for the low price and lowest-volume stocks.  For the lowest-volume stocks, there is 
some evidence consistent with the claim that traders switch from limit to market orders as the 
day passes. Finally, the largest impulse sensitivity with the Last Event Market Buy (Sell) is 
associated with limit buy (sell) orders in all but the highest volume stocks, suggesting that as 
liquidity is extinguished on one side of the book liquidity is added on the opposite side. 
4.4.3 Order Splitting and End-of-Day Effects 
 We perform additional robustness checks on the 7-way event structure and report the 
results in Table 8. We allow for the possibility that traders split orders in Panel A, and determine 
if differences in order choice emerge toward the close of the trading day in Panel B.   
[Insert Table 8.] 
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Order Splitting. A trader can decide to divide the original order into several, smaller 
orders if that appears optimal.  Using the raw data, we might misestimate the coefficients 
because we treat each order as a separate trading decision when, in fact, one decision might 
result in several orders. This is particularly true of the impulse sensitivities associated with the 
Last Event variables.  We control for order splitting by developing an algorithm to identify 
similar successive orders submitted in close proximity to one another.  Our data identify the 
member firm submitting the order as well as the branch office from which the order is submitted.  
We assume that consecutive orders originating from the same branch of the same broker on the 
same side of the market as the prior order are split orders.  To address this potential problem, we 
keep the first order in a series of consecutive “identical” orders and delete the successive orders 
as the outcome of order splitting. We experiment with deleting from one to fifteen successive 
identical orders. In this paper, we report results from examining fifteen successive orders.18 
 We re-estimate the logit model after eliminating “duplicate” orders. The results are in 
Panel A of Table 8.  Except for minor differences in some impulse sensitivities associated with 
quoted size and own return, there are no major departures from the results discussed above. In 
particular, the positive first-order serial correlation in order type is maintained. 
Orders Near the Close. Cushing and Madhavan (2000) find that there is a higher demand 
for immediacy at the close of trading than during the day.  Although our “Time” and “Time-
from-noon-squared” variables address time-of-day effects, we re-estimate equation (1) using 
only orders submitted in the final 15 minutes of the trading day.  This reduces our sample size to 
227,399 events.  Our results, reported in Panel B of Table 8, suggest some differences in order 
                                                 
18 Note that we are not attempting to control for all possible order splitting strategies.  We simply are trying to 
determine whether order splitting strategies explain the positive serial correlation in order type.  We also note that 
not all of the orders in these stocks are routed to the NYSE.  Regional exchanges, NASD market makers and 
Electronic Communication Networks receive orders in these stocks.  Traders might split orders among multiple 
execution venues.  This also suggests that we might not fully characterize order splitting strategies. 
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choice.   The impulse sensitivities associated with our quoted size variables indicate that traders 
appear less willing to join a queue when the end of trading is near.  When bid (ask) size is large, 
traders are less likely to submit buy (sell) limit orders.  There also is less evidence of momentum 
trading in the last 15 minutes of trading.  Finally, the time and time squared variables suggest 
less trading at the end of our 15-minute interval than at the beginning.19 
5. Conclusion 
 This paper analyzes the trader’s order choice decision across different securities and 
under different market conditions for a sample of 148 stocks trading on the NYSE.  We estimate 
a multinomial logit model of order choice to perform a comprehensive test of order choice 
theory. Our main results are: (1.) negative autocorrelations in changes in the order flow processes 
over five minute intervals supporting dynamic limit order book theory, despite positive first-
order autocorrelation in order type; (2.) orders routed to an automatic execution system are much 
less sensitive to market conditions than orders routed to the floor supporting an extreme 
impatience theory of automatic execution customers; (3.) wider (narrower) spreads increase the 
probability of small limit (marketable) orders, but have a negligible effect on large limit 
(marketable) orders; (4.) large ask (bid) depth increases the probability of sells (buys) supporting 
a short-term forecast hypothesis; (5.) large ask (bid) depth increases the probability of an inside-
the-quote limit sell (buy) and decreases the probability of an at-the-quote or behind-the-quote 
limit sell (buy) supporting a “jump the queue” hypothesis; (6.) favorable (unfavorable) forecasts 
of the rest-of-the-day stock return increase the likelihood of buy (sell) orders providing direct 
evidence of effective private information trading; (7.) positive (negative) last-five-minute market 
returns generate more buy (sell) orders indicating momentum-oriented technical trading; (8.) 
order activity is clustered; (9.) doing nothing, defined as the passage of time without order 
                                                 
19 Eliminating time and time-from-noon-squared does not change our conclusions on the other variables. 
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activity, is clustered; and (10.) aggressively priced limit orders are more likely late in the trading 
day providing evidence in support of prior experimental results. 
 As with all empirical studies, several caveats are in order. First, we note that our 
empirical design captures individual orders, not complete order strategies. Although we adjust 
for a simple form of order splitting, we cannot anticipate all possible strategies. We also note that 
all strategies are not equally available to all traders. For example, the model might suggest that 
an order be cancelled, but we cannot observe that outcome if an order has not been previously 
placed. Third, we have only NYSE order data. Without data from all venues trading NYSE-listed 
securities, we cannot fully characterize order choice. During our sample period 83% of the 
sample stocks traders (86% of the volume) occurred on the NYSE. Finally, we focus exclusively 
on electronically-submitted (system) orders. We do not have access to most orders originally 
routed to a floor broker instead of the specialist. 
 Our results have implications for traders, trading venues, and regulators. Traders that 
demand liquidity can adapt their order submissions to maximize the likelihood their orders will 
fill at minimum cost. Liquidity suppliers can access the competition they are likely to face and 
the profitability of their orders. Exchange and regulators can use these results when suggesting 
alterations in trading mechanisms and rules. 
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Appendix: Testing The Statistical Significance of an Impulse sensitivity 
 Let πˆ  be a vector of unrestricted reduced form parameter estimates and Ψ  be the 
covariance matrix of the parameter estimates πˆ . Let ( )h π  be a r -dimensional set of r  
restrictions, which are nonlinear in π , and ( ) /′= ∂ ∂H h π π . For a sample size T , the Wald test 
statistic 
( ) ( ) ( )1ˆ ˆq T −′ ′= h π H ΨH h π  
is asymptotically 2( )rχ  and is asymptotically equivalent to a likelihood ratio test (see Byron, 1974 
and Judge et al, 1985, pgs 615-616). 
 We apply the Wald technique to calculate the statistical significance of an impulse 
sensitivity, where the unrestricted reduced form parameter estimates arise from a multinomial 
logit. An impulse sensitivity is the change in probability of a particular dependent variable 
caused by a one standard deviation shock in an independent variable. 
Let 1, 2, ,i I= K  index the dependent variables, excluding the base case variable. Let 
1, 2, ,j J= K  index the independent variables, including the intercept. Stack the   I x J  reduced 
form estimated coefficients into a (1x IJ ) vector c  in ji  order.20 
 Let ja  and jb  be the mean and standard deviation of the j
th independent variable.21  Insert 
these values into (1x IJ ) vectors to create I  vectors im  and IJ  vectors jis  as shown below. For 
example, here are 1m , 2m , 11s , 21s , 12s , and 22s  
                                                 
20 The ji  order matches the SAS ordering of outputs from a multinomial logit. 
21 As one of the dependent variables, the intercept has a mean of 1 and a standard deviation of 0. 
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s s
M M M
 
 We insert the first mean, 1a , in the 1
st element of the first partition of 1m , the second 
mean, 2a , in the 1
st element of the second partition of 1m , and so on for all J  partitions. 
Similarly, into all of the im  vectors, we insert the means in the i
th element of each partition.  We 
construct 11s  identically to 1m , except that we insert the shock 1b  into the 1
st element of the first 
partition only. Similarly, all of the jis  vectors are identical to the corresponding im  vector, 
except that they add the shock jb  only to the i
th element of the jth partition. 
 Let mjip  be the ji
th probability evaluated at the means of the dependent variables. Let sjip  
be the jith probability evaluated at the mean plus the one standard deviation shock for the jth 
dependent variable and at the means of the other dependent variables. Let jip∆  be the jith change 
in probability, which is calculated as 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 1
exp exp
1 exp 1 exp
s m
ji ji ji I I
k k
p p p
= =
′ ′∆ ≡ − = −
′ ′+ +∑ ∑
i i
jk k
c s c m
c s c m
. 
 Let /jip∂∆ ∂c  be a ( IJ x1) vector of partial derivatives. Using the quotient rule, we get 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 1
2
1
1 1
2
1
exp 1 exp exp exp
    
1 exp
exp 1 exp exp exp
 .
1 exp
I I
ji k k
I
k
I I
k k
I
k
p = =
=
= =
=
   ′ ′ ′ ′⋅ + − ⋅   ∂∆    =∂  ′+  
   ′′ ′ ′ ′⋅ + −      −  ′+  
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∑
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We test a single ( )1r = , cross-equation restriction 0jip∆ = . Using the covariance matrix 
Ψ 22 of the reduced form parameter estimates c  with a sample size of T , the Wald test statistic 
( ) ( )
1
ji ji
ji ji
p p
q T p p
− ′∂∆ ∂∆ = ∆ ∆ ∂ ∂ 
Ψ
c c
 
is asymptotically distributed 2(1)χ . 
For the base case dependent variable, the jth change in probability is  
( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
1 exp 1 exp
s m
j j j I Ip p p
= =
∆ ≡ − = −
′ ′+ +∑ ∑jl l
l l
c s c m
. 
 For the base case dependent variable, the ( IJ x1) vector of partial derivatives /jp∂∆ ∂c  is 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 1
2 2
1 1
exp exp
 .
1 exp 1 exp
I I
j k k
I I
k k
p = =
= =
′′ ′− ⋅∂∆ = +∂    ′ ′+ +      
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
jk jk k k
jk k
s c s m c m
c
c s c m
 
For the single restriction 0jp∆ =  using the same covariance matrix Ψ , the Wald statistic 
( ) ( )
1
j j
j j
p p
q T p p
− ′∂∆ ∂∆ = ∆ ∆ ∂ ∂ 
Ψ
c c
 
is asymptotically distributed 2(1)χ .
                                                 
22 See Maddala (1999), page 37 for details on how to calculate the covariance matrix Ψ  in a multinomial logit. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
The Table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of 148 stocks trading on the New York Stock 
Exchange during the week of April 30 – May 4, 2001. Order size is the pooled time series cross-sectional 
average of the number of shares submitted in orders. Daily share volume is the pooled time series cross-
sectional average of the volume in shares transacted. The shares outstanding variable is the volume 
weighted average of the shares outstanding for the firms in the sample. The National Best Bid Size is the 
size associated with the lowest bid price across all markets quoting the stock. The National Best Offer 
Size is the size associated with the highest ask price across all markets quoting the stock. Percent spread 
is the national best bid-ask spread divided by the average of the national best bid price and the national 
best ask price.  Time is the number of five-minute intervals since midnight. Own return is the change in 
the midpoint of the security’s bid-ask spread over the five minutes prior to the order arrival or 
cancellation. Market return is the change in the midpoint of the midpoint of the bid-ask spread of the 
exchange traded fund representing the Exchange Traded Fund tracking the S&P500 Index. Private 
information variable is measured as [(closing quote midpoint) - (order-time quote midpoint)/(order-time 
quote midpoint)]. 
 
Variable Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Order size  1,231.88 5,501.62 100 900,000 
Daily share volume 2,242,779 1,555,359 555 6,454,023 
Shares outstanding (in 000) 2,118,639 1,942,579 61 9,932,929 
National Best Bid Size (’00) 27.60 68.57 1 5,880 
National Best Offer Size (’00) 37.01 103.59 1 8,376 
Spread midpoint ($) 43.80 23.04 0.525 118.9 
Spread ($) 0.0523 0.0492 0.00 6.14 
Percent spread  0.15  0.20 0.00 26.15 
Last Event Market Buy 0.1250 0.3306 0 1 
Last Event Market Sell 0.1266 0.3320 0 1 
Last Event Limit Buy 0.1641 0.3702 0 1 
Last Event Limit Sell 0.1546 0.3615 0 1 
Time 153.76 24.52 114 192 
Own Return 0.000141 0.009252 -0.086896 0.106667 
Market Return 0.000058 0.001043 -0.002974 0.004434 
Private information 0.002676 0.015272 -0.121806 0.249431 
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Table 2.  Estimation of the 7-Way Event Structure on a Stock-By-Stock Basis 
The table reports the results from estimating equation (1). In Panel A, we report the estimated regression coefficients. In Panel B, we report the impulse sensitivities (change in the 
probability of an event caused by a one standard deviation shock in the explanatory variable).  In each panel we report the mean from 86 regressions. For 85 of our sample stocks, the 
maximum likelihood estimation of equation (1) converges. For the other sample stocks, we pool data into an eighty-sixth regression. 
 
 
 
Event 
Last 
Can. 
Buy 
Last 
Can. 
Sell 
Last 
Limit 
Buy 
Last 
Limit 
Sell 
Last 
Mkt. 
Buy 
Last 
Mkt. 
Sell 
 
Percent 
Spread 
Rel. 
Bid 
Size 
Rel. 
Ask  
Size 
 
Rel. 
Vol. 
 
Own 
Ret. 
Own 
Ret. 
Sqr. 
 
Mkt. 
Ret. 
 
 
Time 
 
Time 
Sqr. 
Private 
Infor-
mation 
NYSE   
Not At 
 NBBO 
Panel A: Mean Estimated Regression Coefficients  
Cancel Buy 1.773 1.045 1.560 1.016 1.005 0.876 39.28 -1.041 -0.200 0.99 45.308 1.36 82.925 0.068 .380 2.085 0.288 
Cancel Sell 0.888 1.712 1.002 1.512 0.735 1.095 36.70 -0.108 -0.558 1.15 -25.53 1.54 -70.07 -2.006 .419 0.406 0.352 
Limit Buy 1.506 1.101 1.354 0.924 0.951 0.865 136.46 0.574 -0.318 1.32 2.442 1.47 81.602 1.905 .404 7.154 0.346 
Limit Sell 1.114 1.520 0.960 1.317 0.842 .0997 154.9 -0.362 0.399 1.41 18.010 1.49 -84.91 0.837 .443 -10.53 0.387 
Market Buy 0.757 0.570 0.674 0.575 1.089 0.469 -132.8 0.835 -0.018 1.17 90.639 1.67 121.96 1.074 .768 9.068 0.286 
Market Sell 0.504 0.855 0.612 0.732 0.647 1.074 -114.0 0.207 0.611 0.77 -104.8 1.14 -105.4 -0.043 .719 -12.90 0.170 
Panel B: Mean Impulse Sensitivities (%) 
Cancel Buy 2.41 0.812 2.21 0.83 0.80 0.45 0.04 -0.32 -0.16 0.14 0.57 0.51 0.47 -0.07 0.20 0.01 0.26 
Cancel Sell 0.83 2.171 0.71 2.08 0.32 0.83 0.06 -0.14 -0.39 0.14 -0.57 0.52 -0.34 -0.16 0.42 -0.12 0.28 
Limit Buy 2.72 1.023 3.93 1.18 1.31 0.80 3.17 0.69 -0.41 0.38 1.08 0.64 0.28 0.48 0.63 0.71 0.49 
Limit Sell 0.99 2.559 1.02 3.40 0.73 1.18 3.50 -0.39 0.55 0.48 -1.13 1.04 -0.38 0.38 0.79 -0.75 0.66 
Market Buy 0.01 -0.263 0.15 -0.12 1.58 0.12 -2.13 0.48 0.01 0.31 1.57 0.40 0.64 0.068 1.64 0.40 0.02 
Market Sell -0.23 0.166 -0.09 0.26 0.21 1.87 -1.98 0.04 0.34 0.21 -1.34 0.45 -0.35 -0.23 1.53 -0.60 0.13 
No Activity -6.74 -6.468 -7.95 -7.64 -4.98 -5.27 -2.67 -0.36 0.06 -1.70 -0.59 -3.60 -0.10 -0.45 -5.20 0.36 -1.86 
Panel C: Hypothesis Predicted Signs of the Impulse Sensitivities 
Cancel Buy          +     +   
Cancel Sell          +     +   
Limit Buy +  -    + +  + - + + ≠0 + + + 
Limit Sell  +  -   +  + + + + - ≠0 + - + 
Market Buy     -  - +  + - - + ≠0 + +  
Market Sell      - -  + + + - - ≠0 + -  
No Activity          -     -   
Coefficients for bid size, ask size, time, and time squared are multiplied by 1,000. Coefficients for relative volume (own return squared) are multiplied by 1,000,000 (10,000). 
Bold numbers are significant at the .01 level with both a standard cross-sectional t-test and a Chi-square test of proportions using the 86 regressions on the regression coefficient estimates 
in Panel A and the impulse sensitivities in Panel B.   The test of proportions tests the null hypothesis that significantly more than one-half of the individual coefficient estimates (in Panel A) 
or impulse sensitivities (in Panel B) have the same sign as the mean. 
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Table 3. Estimation of the 13-Way Event Structure on a Stock-By-Stock Basis 
The table reports the results from estimating equation (1). In Panel A, we report the estimated regression coefficients. In Panel B, we report the impulse sensitivities (change in the probability 
of an event caused by a one standard deviation shock in the explanatory variable).  In each panel we report the mean from 86 regressions. For 85 of our sample stocks, the maximum 
likelihood estimation of equation (1) converges. For the other sample stocks, we pool data into an eighty-sixth regression. 
 
 
 
Event 
Last 
Can. 
Buy 
Last 
Can. 
Sell 
Last 
Limit 
Buy 
Last 
Limit 
Sell 
Last 
Mkt. 
Buy 
Last 
Mkt. 
Sell 
 
Percent 
Spread 
Rel. 
Bid 
Size 
Rel. 
Ask  
Size 
 
Rel. 
Vol. 
 
Own 
Ret. 
Own 
Ret. 
Sqr. 
 
Mkt. 
Ret. 
 
 
Time 
 
Time 
Sqr. 
Private 
Infor-
mation 
NYSE   
Not At 
NBBO 
Panel A.  Regression Coefficient Estimates  
Cancel Buy 0.46 -4.69 2.44 -2.84 2.03 -4.06 48.51 -0.43 -0.43 0.96 12.13 1.40 36.44 -0.19 0.40 -1.77 0.22 
Cancel Sell -4.61 0.33 -2.98 2.46 -4.3 2.15 56.49 -0.48 -0.26 1.08 5.23 1.44 -35.66 -0.54 0.42 -3.16 0.28 
BTQ Limit Buy 1.26 1.15 1.51 1.20 0.82 0.84 7.21 -1.55 0.60 0.86 -3.68 0.93 1.15 0.08 0.74 8.12 0.08 
ATQ Limit Buy 1.16 1.07 1.23 0.91 0.80 0.73 159.0 -0.87 -0.09  1.31 54.84 -1.81 104.9 3.65 0.27 4.66 0.20 
ITQ Limit Buy 1.28 0.87 1.35 0.92 0.79 0.87 237.2 2.37 -2.05 1.28 6.21 0.90 115.8 2.67 0.30 9.34 0.24 
ITQ Limit Sell 1.03 1.08 0.93 1.33 0.83 1.04 275.8 -1.85 1.64 0.98 16.65 0.90 -126.8 0.48 0.28 -11.16 0.31 
ATQ Limit Sell 0.71 1.32 0.74 1.40 0.71 1.06 179.7 0.17 -0.37 1.19 38.43 1.30 -93.21 1.18 0.32 -14.01 0.27 
BTQ Limit Sell 1.30 1.04 0.93 1.36 0.67 0.98 14.70 0.17 -1.02 0.96 -6.38 1.44 -4.20 4.04 0.84 -7.69 0.29 
Mkt. Limit Buy 1.03 0.77 0.94 0.80 0.94 0.44 -468.3 1.89 -1.00 1.34 34.03 1.84 174.7 -0.09 0.69 9.28 0.20 
Mkt. Limit Sell 0.51 1.06 0.44 0.78 0.84 1.38 -379.5 -0.74 1.27 1.20 -15.45 1.66 -131.1 -3.00 0.68 -16.58 -0.41 
Market Buy 0.78 0.57 0.92 0.81 1.36 0.64 2.69 -0.35 0.29 1.01 65.28 1.16 123.8 2.78 0.79 5.10 -0.15 
Market Sell 0.59 0.81 0.81 .093 0.61 1.40 -9.69 -0.46 0.32 -.49 -76.94 0.67 -146.3 1.47 0.72 -4.57 0.07 
Panel B.  Mean Impulse Sensitivities (%) 
Cancel Buy 0.04 -1.05 1.74 -1.15 1.06 -1.10 0.08 -0.04 -0.07 0.03 0.01 0.14 0.06 -0.04 0.08 0.01 0.08 
Cancel Sell -0.93 0.05 -1.09 1.61 -1.02 1.05 0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.01 0.14 -0.06 -0.04 0.10 -0.04 0.93 
BTQ Limit Buy 1.17 1.07 1.45 0.92 0.51 0.50 -0.36 -0.37 0.29 0.12 -0.15 0.34 -0.00 -0.14 0.85 0.06 0.18 
ATQ Limit Buy 1.09 0.02 1.80 0.44 0.65 0.41 1.07 -0.34 -0.14 0.10 -0.12 0.23 0.54 0.42 -0.06 0.27 0.14 
ITQ Limit Buy 1.21 0.78 1.74 0.62 0.73 0.50 2.26 1.04 -1.07 0.22 0.10 0.17 0.80 0.32 0.37 0.57 0.29 
ITQ Limit Sell 0.70 1.15 0.54 1.56 0.44 0.74 2.55 -0.78 0.96 0.20 0.14 0.12 -0.80 0.19 -0.08 -0.37 0.43 
ATQ Limit Sell 0.55 0.98 0.40 1.53 0.44 0.55 1.17 -0.07 -0.23 0.16 0.28 0.31 -0.45 0.25 0.01 -0.43 0.22 
BTQ Limit Sell 1.00 1.03 0.86 1.20 0.86 0.45 -0.10 0.14 -0.37 0.25 0.07 035 0.00 -0.02 1.01 -0.12 0.08 
Mkt. Limit Buy 0.32 0.12 0.28 1.69 0.69 0.18 -1.64 0.27 -0.12 0.16 0.16 0.36 0.60 -0.11 0.57 0.24 0.05 
Mkt. Limit Sell 0.22 0.39 0.19 0.34 0.23 0.78 -1.50 -0.02 0.23 0.19 0.01 0.39 -0.42 -0.28 0.56 -0.31 -0.10 
Market Buy 0.59 0.23 0.60 0.39 1.60 0.46 -0.54 0.20 0.11 0.19 0.57 0.25 0.90 0.18 1.26 0.17 -0.02 
Market Sell 0.25 0.67 0.42 0.69 0.50 1.90 -0.65 0.09 0.19 0.07 -0.37 0.35 -0.99 0.03 1.12 -0.29 0.14 
No Activity -6.24 -6.08 -8.97 -8.97 -6.20 -6.47 -2.36 -0.06 0.28 -1.70 -0.72 -3.20 -0.17 0.74 -5.48 0.22 -1.60 
BTQ = Behind-The-Quote; ATQ = At-The-Quote; ITQ = Inside-The-Quote.  Coefficients for bid size, ask size, time, & time squared are multiplied by 1,000. Coefficients for relative 
volume & own return squared are multiplied by 1,000,000 & 10,000 respectively. Bold numbers are significant at the .01 level using a both a standard cross-sectional t-test and a Chi-
square test of proportions using the 86 regressions on the regression coefficient estimates in Panel A and the impulse sensitivities in Panel B.   The test of proportions tests the null 
hypothesis that significantly more than one-half of the individual coefficient estimates (in Panel A) or impulse sensitivities (in Panel B) are in the same direction as the mean. 
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Table 4.  OLS Regressions of Orders / No Activity Events Aggregated Over Five Minute Intervals 
The table reports the results from estimating equation (1) aggregated over five minute intervals. In Panel A, we report the estimated OLS regression coefficients, where each row is one OLS 
regression. In each row, the dependent variable is the change in number of orders or no activity events for a given stock over a five minute interval compared to the previous five minute 
interval. In Panel B, we report the economic sensitivities (change in the number of orders or no activity events caused by a one standard deviation shock in the explanatory variable). 
 
 
OLS 
Dependent 
Variable 
Last  
5 Min 
Can. 
Buy 
Last 
 5 Min 
Can. 
Sell 
Last 
5 Min 
Limit 
Buy 
Last 
5 Min 
Limit 
Sell 
Last 
5 Min 
Mkt. 
Buy 
Last 
5 Min 
Mkt. 
Sell 
 
 
Percent 
Spread 
 
Rel. 
Bid 
Size 
 
Rel. 
Ask  
Size 
 
 
Rel. 
Vol. 
 
 
Own 
Ret. 
 
Own 
Ret. 
Sqr. 
 
 
Mkt. 
Ret. 
 
 
 
Time 
 
 
Time 
Sqr. 
 
Private 
Infor-
mation 
 
NYSE   
Not At 
 NBBO 
Panel A: Estimated OLS Regression Coefficients  
Cancel Buy -0.41 0.23 0.06 -0.10 0.11 -0.03 7.37 0.001 -0.006 -0.07 72 -147 1170 -60 0.37 88.97 -1.41 
Cancel Sell 0.19 -0.37 -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.04 2.28 0.001 -0.008 -0.05 -227 61 -1986 -52 0.63 29.38 -0.62 
Limit Buy 0.16 0.41 -0.43 -0.17 0.14 0.04 -0.38 0.003 -0.021 -0.18 -613 748 1292 -72 0.09 147.67 -0.44 
Limit Sell 0.29 0.25 -0.01 -0.53 0.09 0.05 0.70 0.003 -0.025 -0.12 137 -324 -841 -55 0.10 43.60 2.54 
Market Buy 0.05 0.45 0.02 -0.15 -0.30 0.06 -17.50 0.003 -0.019 -0.19 -722 755 2975 -41 0.06 199.90 -3.46 
Market Sell 0.37 0.13 -0.13 -0.01 0.06 -0.39 -19.56 0.004 -0.036 -0.19 -245 107 -1658 -49 0.82 31.22 -2.58 
No Activity 0.62 0.67 -0.21 -0.34 -0.11 0.04 -24.16 0.005 -0.040 -0.13 -133 111 -3214 -297 -1.69 186.78 -5.56 
Panel B: Economic Sensitivities (Change in the Number of Orders or No Activity Events Caused By One Std Dev Shock in the Explanatory Variable) 
Cancel Buy -20.03 11.00 5.10 -8.34 8.88 -1.92 0.09 0.13 -0.10 -0.04 0.18 -0.23 0.57 -1.37 0.17 0.58 -0.25 
Cancel Sell 9.21 -17.60 -4.11 0.78 2.27 2.76 0.03 0.15 -0.15 -0.03 -0.57 0.10 -0.98 -1.18 0.29 0.19 -0.11 
Limit Buy 7.81 19.19 -37.19 -13.76 10.71 3.24 0.00 0.42 -0.38 -0.10 -1.53 1.19 0.63 -1.64 0.04 0.96 -0.08 
Limit Sell 14.28 11.67 -0.53 -44.08 6.77 4.21 0.01 0.45 -0.46 -0.06 0.34 -0.51 -0.41 -1.24 0.04 0.28 0.45 
Market Buy 2.31 21.01 1.56 -12.20 -23.92 4.44 -0.22 0.42 -0.34 -0.11 -1.80 1.20 1.46 -0.94 0.03 1.29 -0.61 
Market Sell 18.35 6.20 -11.01 -1.07 4.75 -30.05 -0.25 0.63 -0.66 -0.10 -0.61 0.17 -0.81 -1.11 0.38 0.20 -0.46 
No Activity 30.16 31.55 -17.86 -28.20 -8.59 3.11 -0.31 0.77 -0.73 -0.07 -0.33 0.18 -1.58 -6.72 -0.77 1.21 -0.98 
Coefficients for bid size, ask size, time, and time squared are multiplied by 1,000. Coefficients for relative volume (own return squared) are multiplied by 1,000,000 (10,000). 
Bold numbers are significant at the .01 level based on a standard t-test. The sample size is 11,398. 
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Table 5. Separating Automatically Executed Orders and Floor Orders 
 
We report impulse sensitivities (change in an event’s probability due to a shock in an explanatory variable) from a pooled cross-sectional regression.  To do this, we estimate equation (1) and 
evaluate the estimated logistic at the explanatory variables’ mean values. We then re-evaluate the estimated logistic after adding a one standard deviation to one explanatory variable.  Due to 
the large sample size, all impulse responses are statistically significant at traditional levels.  Panel B compares the magnitudes of the impulse responses for the floor and automatic marketable 
orders.  The reported number is the absolute value of the ratio of the floor-execution sensitivity divided by the automatic-execution sensitivity. 
 
 
 
Event 
Last 
Can. 
Buy 
Last 
Can. 
Sell 
Last 
Limit 
Buy 
Last 
Limit 
Sell 
Last 
Mkt. 
Buy 
Last 
Mkt. 
Sell 
 
Percent 
Spread 
Rel. 
Bid 
Size 
Rel. 
Ask  
Size 
 
Rel. 
Vol. 
 
Own 
Ret. 
Own 
Ret. 
Sqr. 
 
Mkt. 
Ret. 
 
 
Time 
 
Time 
Sqr. 
Private 
Infor-
mation 
NYSE   
Not At 
NBBO 
Panel A.  Impulse Sensitivities (%) 
Cancel Buy 2.59 1.03 1.90 0.85 0.73 0.38 0.62 0.10 -0.14 0.06 0.47 -0.41 0.55 -0.19 0.31 0.07 0.24 
Cancel Sell 1.02 2.36 0.82 1.76 0.40 0.80 0.89 0.10 -0.75 0.07 -0.14 0.14 -0.56 -0.26 0.47 -0.08 0.25 
Limit Buy 1.92 0.89 3.12 1.19 1.17 0.56 3.40 -0.43 -0.08 0.31 -0.36 0.24 0.55 0.12 0.84 0.28 0.72 
Limit Sell 0.89 1.82 1.16 2.94 0.57 1.17 3.37 -0.48 -0.30 0.29 0.95 -0.72 -0.55 0.17 1.01 -0.42 0.82 
Floor MB 1.63 -0.09 0.51 0.12 2.10 0.41 -3.21 -0.14 -0.40 0.69 -0.14 0.14 1.52 -0.02 1.95 0.32 0.43 
Floor MS -0.11 0.26 0.10 0.61 0.45 2.62 -3.12 0.21 -0.53 0.58 -0.14 0.17 -1.37 0.30 1.84 -0.50 0.40 
Auto-ex MB 0.01 0.001 0.01 -0.001 0.03 -0.0001 -0.12 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.001 
Auto-ex MS -0.0008 0.01 0.0006 .0008 -0.00 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.002 0.01 -0.001 0.003 -0.01 -0.004 0.005 0.0002 -0.002 
No Activity -6.50 -6.29 -1.76 -7.51 -5.77 -5.97 -1.76 0.64 2.23 -2.05 -0.59 0.45 -0.14 0.50 -6.45 0.31 -2.89 
Panel B.  Absolute Value of Floor / Automatic 
Floor/Elec MB 163 90 51 120 70 4,100 26 14 40 69 7 7 76 20 195 32 430 
Floor/Elec MS 137 26 166 762 -- 262 52 21 265 58 140 56 137 75 368 2,500 200 
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Table 6.  Impulse Sensitivities (%) of the 7-Way Event Structure By Order Size 
The table reports the impulse sensitivities (change in the probability of an event caused by a one standard deviation shock in the explanatory variable).  To do this, we first estimate equation 
(1) and evaluate the estimated logistic equation at the mean value of all explanatory variables. We then re-evaluate the estimated logistic after adding a one standard deviation to one 
explanatory variable and report the change in the probability. 
 
 
 
Event 
Last 
Can. 
Buy 
Last 
Can. 
Sell 
Last 
Limit 
Buy 
Last 
Limit 
Sell 
Last 
Mkt. 
Buy 
Last 
Mkt. 
Sell 
 
Percent 
Spread 
Rel. 
Bid 
Size 
Rel. 
Ask  
Size 
 
Rel. 
Vol. 
 
Own 
Ret. 
Own 
Ret. 
Sqr. 
 
Mkt. 
Ret. 
 
 
Time 
 
Time 
Sqr. 
Private 
Infor-
mation 
NYSE   
Not At 
NBBO 
Panel A:  Large Orders ( > 9,999 shares) 
Cancel  Buy 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.002 -0.002 0.0009 0.03 -0.02 0.004 -0.003 0.06 -0.003 0.01 
Cancel Sell 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.09 0.002 0.007 -0.002 0.003 -0.01 -0.003 0.08 -0.004 0.01 
Limit Buy 0.08 0.06 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.05 -0.07 0.004 0.02 -0.006 0.004 0.01 0.004 0.21 -0.008 0.04 
Limit Sell 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.18 0.10 0.12 0.06 -0.36 -0.0001 0.03 -0.009 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.28 -0.02 0.07 
Market Buy 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.01 -0.11 0.003 0.02 0.21 -0.13 0.02 -0.02 0.24 0.02 0.02 
Market Sell 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.03 -0.24 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.23 -0.03 0.02 
No Activity -0.33 -0.35 -0.55 -0.57 -0.49 -0.52 -0.18 0.89 0.02 -0.10 -0.21 0.13 0.02 0.01 -1.13 0.05 -0.18 
Panel B:  Medium Orders (999 < shares < 10,000) 
Cancel Buy 1.10 0.57 0.94 0.55 0.48 0.36 0.75 -0.21 -0.27 0.23 0.13 -0.14 0.07 -0.10 0.57 0.03 0.22 
Cancel Sell 0.64 1.17 0.62 1.02 0.41 0.58 0.82 -2.39 -0.04 0.22 -0.04 0.05 0.16 -0.08 0.67 -0.02 0.21 
Limit Buy 1.30 0.85 1.88 1.19 0.98 0.82 0.18 -1.45 -0.79 0.61 -0.13 0.07 -0.19 0.13 1.54 0.06 0.73 
Limit Sell 0.89 1.41 1.28 2.08 0.86 1.14 0.19 -1.19 -0.78 0.67 0.71 -0.54 0.09 0.18 1.62 -0.19 0.77 
Mkt. Buy 0.52 0.35 0.80 0.57 1.61 0.62 -1.33 -0.93 -0.51 0.57 -0.03 0.04 -0.10 -0.19 1.61 0.15 0.44 
Mkt. Sell 0.37 0.56 0.59 0.83 0.64 1.69 -1.31 -3.91 -0.23 0.55 0.05 0.07 0.81 -0.26 1.64 -0.28 0.44 
No Activity -4.85 -4.94 -6.14 -6.26 -5.00 -5.23 -2.65 10.11 2.59 -2.87 -0.57 0.42 -0.65 0.32 -7.67 0.24 -2.84 
Panel C:  Small Orders ( < 1,000 shares) 
Cancel Buy 2.53 1.10 1.97 1.01 0.81 0.50 0.02 0.15 -0.13 0.05 0.54 -0.45 0.51 -0.17 0.37 0.04 0.31 
Cancel Sell 1.03 2.18 0.91 1.72 0.46 0.82 0.37 0.53 -1.44 0.09 -0.13 0.11 -0.48 -0.25 0.46 -0.08 0.30 
Limit Buy 1.96 1.08 3.16 1.37 1.29 0.70 2.01 -1.31 0.47 1.84 -0.29 0.20 0.60 -0.03 0.71 0.26 0.64 
Limit Sell 1.06 1.74 1.27 2.77 0.64 1.17 1.91 -1.87 -0.06 0.004 0.89 -0.70 -0.60 -0.02 0.76 -0.36 0.70 
Mkt. Buy 0.35 0.11 0.65 0.30 2.22 0.51 -2.62 -0.48 -0.48 0.49 -0.16 0.14 1.23 0.07 1.80 0.25 0.38 
Mkt. Sell 0.07 0.42 0.27 0.74 0.52 2.40 -2.34 0.47 0.63 0.40 -0.11 0.13 -1.15 -0.17 1.63 -0.39 0.32 
No Activity -7.03 -6.65 -8.26 -7.93 -5.95 -6.12 6.47 2.50 2.72 -1.24 -0.73 0.56 -0.11 0.56 -5.58 0.29 -2.68 
. 
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Table 7. Impulse Sensitivities (%) of the 7-Way Event Structure By Volume and Price Category 
 
The table reports the impulse sensitivities (change in the probability of an event caused by a one standard deviation shock in the explanatory variable) derived from equation (1) estimates. 
 
 
 
Event 
Last 
Can. 
Buy 
Last 
Can. 
Sell 
Last 
Limit 
Buy 
Last 
Limit 
Sell 
Last 
Mkt. 
Buy 
Last 
Mkt. 
Sell 
 
Percent 
Spread 
Rel. 
Bid 
Size 
Rel. 
Ask  
Size 
 
Rel. 
Vol. 
 
Own 
Ret. 
Own 
Ret. 
Sqr. 
 
Mkt. 
Ret. 
 
 
Time 
 
Time 
Sqr. 
Private 
Infor-
mation 
NYSE   
Not At 
NBBO 
Panel A: Highest Volume Stocks 
Cancel Buy 2.45 0.95 1.76 0.81 0.69 0.37 0.16 -0.28 -0.08 0.16 0.45 0.27 0.24 -0.19 0.27 0.10 0.26 
Cancel Sell 0.94 2.25 0.79 1.62 0.39 0.75 0.26 -0.17 -0.24 0.13 -0.49 0.37 -0.18 -0.16 0.38 -0.12 0.26 
Limit Buy 1.74 0.73 2.66 0.92 0.93 0.42 3.53 0.28 -0.15 0.41 0.83 0.29 -0.62 0.22 0.66 0.51 0.48 
Limit Sell 0.68 1.56 0.85 2.40 0.42 0.93 3.61 -0.23 0.21 0.46 -0.74 0.42 0.72 0.39 0.62 -0.58 0.44 
Mkt. Buy 0.07 -0.17 0.37 0.006 2.10 0.12 -2.24 0.47 - 0.41 1.82 0.55 0.06 -0.02 1.91 0.36 0.02 
Mkt. Sell -0.20 0.15 -0.006 0.45 0.17 2.45 -2.17 0.03 0.44 0.27 -1.67 0.54 -0.03 -0.30 1.79 -0.65 0.09 
No Activity -5.69 -5.48 -6.45 -6.24 -4.76 -5.06 -3.15 -0.25 -0.13 -1.86 -0.18 -2.46 -0.19 -0.06 -5.56 0.39 -1.56 
Panel B: High-Volume, High-Price Stocks 
Cancel Buy 2.71 0.63 2.74 0.92 0.95 0.53 0.02 -0.34 -0.21 0.15 0.77 0.49 0.70 0.06 0.07 -0.07 0.25 
Cancel Sell 0.71 2.36 0.65 2.47 0.21 0.88 -0.07 -0.20 -0.38 0.09 -0.63 0.41 -0.68 -0.10 0.49 -0.01 0.47 
Limit Buy 3.12 1.39 6.07 1.32 1.76 1.13 2.28 1.12 -0.64 0.25 1.21 0.72 -0.14 1.12 0.87 1.06 0.79 
Limit Sell 1.36 2.98 1.02 4.72 1.07 1.36 2.93 -0.43 0.96 0.40 -1.53 1.00 0.09 0.62 1.02 -0.77 1.20 
Mkt. Buy 0.05 -0.29 -0.08 -0.21 0.94 0.17 -1.82 0.58 0.01 0.17 0.87 0.39 1.12 0.10 1.17 0.44 0.06 
Mkt. Sell -0.24 0.16 -0.22 0.07 0.20 0.99 -1.69 0.06 0.43 0.12 0.84 0.38 -0.51 -0.23 1.20 -0.46 0.11 
No Activity -7.72 -7.24 -10.90 -9.31 -5.15 -5.08 -1.64 -0.78 -0.17 -1.20 -0.58 -3.41 0.41 -1.58 -4.84 -0.18 -2.91 
Panel C: High-Volume, Low-Price Stocks  
Cancel Buy 1.80 0.63 2.69 0.73 0.87 0.59 -0.24 -0.46 -0.24 0.06 0.70 0.64 0.79 0.13 0.14 -0.20 0.21 
Cancel Sell 0.73 1.60 0.56 2.80 0.28 0.93 -0.33 -0.43 -0.33 0.26 -0.68 0.87 -0.35 -0.22 0.41 -0.28 0.07 
Limit Buy 4.85 1.27 4.41 1.71 1.60 1.32 3.52 1.35 3.52 0.51 1.78 1.14 0.39 0.36 0.25 0.73 0.22 
Limit Sell 1.35 4.69 1.49 4.23 1.00 1.52 4.13 -0.83 4.13 0.69 -1.71 0.77 -0.07 0.03 0.96 -1.16 0.48 
Mkt. Buy -0.27 -0.44 -0.11 -0.33 0.97 0.04 -2.22 0.43 -2.22 0.22 0.85 0.42 1.73 0.27 1.47 0.37 0.003 
Mkt. Sell -0.31 .017 -0.17 -0.02 0.24 1.34 -1.83 0.06 -1.83 0.17 -0.77 0.79 -1.09 -0.07 1.22 -0.60 0.26 
No Activity -8.15 -7.09 -8.87 -9.13 -4.99 -5.78 -3.00 -0.12 3.00 -1.94 -1.40 -4.65 -0.17 -0.50 -4.48 1.15 -1.06 
Panel D: Low-Volume Stocks 
Cancel Buy 3.59 .98 4.11 .86 1.50 .43 -.39 .05 .003 .004 .043 9.73 .71 -.60 .25 .68 1.21 
Cancel Sell .57 2.86 .87 3.76 .27 1.65 .13 -.08 -.07 .03 -1.54 3.90 -.31 -.65 .46 -.18 .67 
Limit Buy 6.07 2.34 8.79 1.55 3.73 2.70 .17 -.08 -.22 .07 -1.23 7.95 1.58 .004 .39 2.33 1.42 
Limit Sell 1.81 5.91 1.62 7.56 3.07 3.48 .56 -1.06 .15 .07 -1.28 34.84 -1.75 -.25 1.02 -1.49 1.99 
Mkt. Buy .01 -.57 -.49 -.62 1.32 .33 -1.75 .16 -.06 -.001 16.46 -6.78 .21 .42 1.36 1.56 .52 
Mkt. Sell -.17 .28 .11 .22 1.28 2.56 -1.50 .16 .01 -.01 -5.51 -7.23 -.06 .31 1.21 -1.14 .14 
No Activity -11.90 -11.83 -45.40 -13.35 -11.19 -11.17 2.77 .85 .19 -.17 -6.92 -42.42 -.38 .77 -4.71 -1.75 -5.51 
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Table 8. Impulse Sensitivities (%) for the Robustness Checks of the 7-Way Event Structure 
 
We report impulse sensitivities (change in an event’s probability due to a shock in an explanatory variable).  To do this, we estimate equation (1) and evaluate the estimated logistic at the 
explanatory variables’ mean values. We then re-evaluate the estimated logistic after adding a one standard deviation to one explanatory variable. 
 
 
 
Event 
Last 
Can. 
Buy 
Last 
Can. 
Sell 
Last 
Limit 
Buy 
Last 
Limit 
Sell 
Last 
Mkt. 
Buy 
Last 
Mkt. 
Sell 
 
Percent 
Spread 
Rel. 
Bid 
Size 
Rel. 
Ask  
Size 
 
Rel. 
Vol. 
 
Own 
Ret. 
Own 
Ret. 
Sqr. 
 
Mkt. 
Ret. 
 
 
Time 
 
Time 
Sqr. 
Private 
Infor-
mation 
NYSE   
Not At 
NBBO 
Panel A.  Correcting for Possible Order Splitting 
Cancel Buy 1.48 0.99 1.72 0.87 0.69 0.44 0.61 0.40 -0.25 0.07 0.55 -0.47 0.49 -0.16 0.34 0.08 0.26 
Cancel Sell 0.92 1.40 0.83 1.60 0.42 0.75 0.67 0.39 -0.69 0.10 -0.14 0.13 -0.50 -0.21 0.49 -0.07 0.27 
Limit Buy 1.84 1.06 2.00 1.39 1.23 0.67 2.39 -0.76 -0.79 0.27 -0.36 0.22 0.50 0.14 0.92 0.28 0.81 
Limit Sell 1.09 1.78 1.42 2.00 0.68 1.26 3.31 -3.41 -0.34 0.30 0.97 -0.74 -0.51 0.18 1.04 -0.44 0.84 
Market Buy 0.41 0.10 0.78 0.35 2.07 0.53 -3.60 0.01 -0.42 0.78 -0.18 0.17 1.59 -0.06 2.03 0.36 0.42 
Market Sell 0.10 0.47 0.35 0.86 0.55 2.28 -3.41 0.67 -0.55 0.66 -0.15 0.18 -1.42 -0.35 1.94 -0.52 0.39 
No Activity -5.86 -5.80 -7.13 -7.08 -5.69 -5.92 -0.88 2.69 3.06 -2.21 -0.67 0.49 -0.15 0.46 -6.79 0.30 -3.02 
Panel B.  Orders in the Final 15 Minutes of Trading 
Cancel Buy 2.09 0.68 1.39 0.51 0.46 0.30 1.48 -5.51 0.01 -0.20 -0.001 -0.27 0.70 -6.46 -6.49 -0.09 0.29 
Cancel Sell 0.76 1.88 0.47 1.38 0.21 0.67 2.53 0.98 -0.58 -0.07 -0.08 0.20 -0.38 -5.87 -6.51 -0.30 0.67 
Limit Buy 1.65 0.68 2.96 1.36 1.02 0.56 9.90 -3.21 0.76 -0.14 -0.26 0.14 0.56 -16.02 -13.58 -0.16 0.34 
Limit Sell 0.87 2.08 1.54 3.24 0.83 1.00 9.34 2.58 -0.50 0.35 0.05 -0.08 -0.36 -16.09 -15.39 -0.84 0.46 
Market Buy 0.02 -3.96 0.34 -0.04 3.18 0.55 -8.38 -2.06 -1.12 0.95 -0.46 0.53 1.37 -14.80 82.02 1.95 0.03 
Market Sell -0.41 -0.07 -0.11 0.19 0.36 2.26 -5.13 -0.75 0.52 0.23 -0.25 0.41 -1.18 -12.47 -12.44 -1.93 -0.02 
No Activity -5.00 -4.86 -6.61 -6.66 -6.08 -5.36 -9.76 7.96 1.97 -1.12 1.02 -0.94 -0.71 71.74 -27.59 1.41 -1.18 
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Figure 1. Aggregate Buy and Sell Orders By Time Of Day. 
 
Total number of buy orders and sell orders for 148 stocks by time of day on April 3, 2001. 
